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Abstract I provide a compositional account of about-PPs in combination with
attitude predicates and content nouns, and as a predicate. The account requires
that attitude predicates are properties of content-bearing eventualities, rather than
relations that take propositions (or other clause denotations) as arguments. I argue
further that the relevant notion of ‘content’ must be extremely general, allowing for
question-like, proposition-like, and hybrid meanings.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines attitude reports through the lens of the English preposition
about, which is extremely productive. Three core uses are illustrated in (1–3):
(1) Indirect reports: John {asked / wondered / knows / dreamed / etc.} about
{Mary / whether Mary dances}.
(2) Content nouns: John read a {book / article / story / blurb / etc.} about Mary.
(3) Predication: {The question / the claim} was about {Mary / why Mary left}.
The productivity of about suggests that we need a cross-categorial, compositional
account. However, about is also what I term over-productive. By this I mean that,
though its internal argument can always be either a DP or an interrogative, its external
distribution does not match either of these categories. For example, there are verbs
like wonder that don’t take DPs without about, and verbs like think that take neither
DPs nor interrogatives without about.
(4) John wondered {*Mary / !about Mary}.
(5) a. John thought {*Mary / *why Mary left / !that Mary left}.
b. John thought about {!Mary / !why Mary left / *that Mary left}.
∗ For discussion of this work I am grateful to Pranav Anand, Donka Farkas, Ilaria Frana, Marcin
Morzycki, Paul Portner, members of the JHU Sentence++ group, and participants of SALT 23.
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The example of think is particularly interesting because when combined with about,
it acts like a question-embedding predicate. An account of over-productivity requires
not just a compositional account, but a detailed understanding of the lexical semantics
of a range of indirect report predicates and how that might interact with a range
of argument types. This leads to the third, and most basic puzzle: what theory of
attitudes can account for the behavior and distribution of about?
I argue here that the best account involves not the classical Hintikkan rela-
tional treatment, but something more exotic. In particular, following Kratzer 2006;
Moulton 2009; Anand & Hacquard 2009, 2013; Hacquard 2010 most directly, (see
also Moltmann 1989, 2003, 2013; Ginzburg 1995a inter alia) I argue that attitude
predicates are properties of eventualities that have content. ‘Arguments’ to attitude
predicates tell us about that content intersectively, rather than relationally. Selec-
tional restrictions are therefore necessarily decoupled from the structure of content;
this builds on a long history of disentangling syntactic and semantic complement
clause selection (Grimshaw 1979; Pesetsky 1982 and many others).
I further argue, based on the sheer variety of about-taking predicates, that
this non-classical account of attitude predicates must be paired with a rich, gen-
eral notion of content. Following much work in the questions literature, I use an
alternative-structured notion of content, and in particular make use of hybrid alter-
native structures from Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009; Ciardelli, Groenendijk &
Roelofsen 2010. This allows for contents that are a mix of informative and what
Groenendijk 1999 terms ‘inquisitive,’ i.e., having alternatives. The role of about is
to connect up some alternative structure provided by its internal argument with the
content of its external argument. It contributes that this internal alternative structure
is non-orthogonal (Lewis 1988a) to the content of its external argument.
In the first part of this paper, §2, I go into detail about the range and types of
predicates that about-PPs can combine with, building up a large sample of predicates
via corpus work and expanding the arguments sketched above. I will examine both
productivity and over-productivity in more detail, as well as lay out existing proposals
in the literature. In the second part of the paper, §3, I turn to the analysis, setting
out what is necessary to account for both the productivity and over-productivity of
about. There I begin with content nouns, develop a general theory of ‘content,’ and
provide several case studies of particular verbs that take about.
2 Assessing the productivity of about
I have claimed that about is productive, implying that a compositional analysis
is necessary.1 However, this alone doesn’t determine what kind of compositional
1 Note that I set aside the approximation use of about (see Zaroukian 2013) as well as the spatial sense.
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analysis is necessary. In the following sections I first lay out some of the previous
strategies that have been tried for about, and then explore both productivity and
over-productivity in detail in light of these strategies.
2.1 Analytical strategies for about
There are three strategies that have been taken for understanding about in prior work.
The formal strategy, due to Pesetsky (1982), is to take this preposition to be one of
the class of prepositions that appear for formal reasons, i.e., to mark case.2 That is,
some verbs cannot case-mark their internal argument on their own, and so require a
preposition such as of, on, or perhaps about to do so. The reduction strategy, due to
Boër 1978, reduces the effect of an about-phrase to an already-understood argument
type; Boër’s particular proposal (though somewhat more complicated than this)
amounts to reducing about-PP arguments to (propositional) that-clause arguments.3
However, the general strategy need not be implemented that way, and the reduction
could be to interrogative complements. I will argue that both of these strategies
are wrong, based on the distribution of about-phrases and their interaction with
verb-specific selectional restrictions.
The third and more recent strategy, developed in Moulton 2009, is more subtle.
Moulton proposes that about+DP provides a res argument for a de re attitude predi-
cation (Quine 1956; Lewis 1979; Cresswell & von Stechow 1982; Chierchia 1989
inter alia; Moulton uses in particular the analysis of de re ascriptions from Kratzer
1998, 2006). Moulton explicitly denies that an about-PP provides the ‘content’ of
an ascription. That is, if John thought about Mary, he had a thought whose content
we do not know, but that centered on Mary. This is intuitive, particularly given that
the word about litters the paraphrases of papers about de re ascription. I will not
suggest that this account is wrong. Rather, I will suggest that it is not complete, and
raises a number of questions that must be answered. In the rest of this section, I visit
evidence bearing on these strategies.
2.2 What predicates does it combine with?
The purest version of the formal strategy would lead us to expect that about is chosen
idiosyncratically by predicates that it appears with. (In fact, this seems to be true for
2 (Pesetsky 1991: note 6), argues against this strategy, and implies that about serves a dual-role in both
case-marking and interpretation.
3 The particular puzzle that concerned Boër was that tell that is non-factive, tell wh- is factive, and tell
about wh- is not factive. Hence, the function of about was to (effectively) convert an interrogative
clause into a proposition, by existentially quantifying over a set of alternatives. Boër’s (1978) puzzle,
which he termed ‘semantic cross-over,’ is only one side of the coin. Also, not all verbs that take about
work like this; know about seems just as factive as know wh-, an issue I deal with in §3.5.
338
About ‘about’
a range of other prepositions, such as of.) In this section, I provide evidence to the
contrary: about is extremely productive and cross-categorial. An about-PP occurs in
three key contexts: as a sister to various nominals, as a sister to various attitudinal
predicates, and most importantly for the argument, in a predicative use.
I begin with the use of about-PPs in predicative copular sentences, illustrated in
(6). This use is extremely productive, and typically the subject DPs involve nominals
that could alternatively be modified by an about-PP. This behavior contrasts with
apparently similar prepositions such as of, and suggests both that a compositional
(not purely formal) account is necessary, and that the type of an about-PP is that of a
predicate of some sort.
(6) That book is about Joanna. (!a book about Joanna)
(7) * That book is of songs. (!a book of songs)
The nouns that an about-PP can appear as sister to subsume what Moltmann
(1989) terms content nominalizations (see also Vendler 1972; Ginzburg 1995a,b;
Moltmann 2003, 2007; Uegaki 2012 inter alia). To give a sense of the range of
possibilities, in (8) I have provided a subjective classification based on 456 nouns
that appeared with about in a corpus search in Davies 2008-.4
(8) a. John read a { book / article / story / blurb / letter / etc. } about Mary.
Media artifact
b. John heard a { rumor / story / anecdote / tale / lie / etc. } about Mary.
Communication
c. John raised a(n) { question / issue / inquiry / opinion / problem } about
Mary. Abstract entity/communication
d. John knows a { conclusion / fact / thing / misconception / prediction /
principle / etc. } about Mary. Abstract entity
e. John’s {ambivalence / anxiety / complex / despair / frustration / honesty /
insight / naivete / sadness / etc. } about Mary surprised everyone.
Mental state
About-PPs show up similarly with a wide range of predicates (I return to the
makeup of this class in more detail in §2.4). Two key cases are mental state and
communication verbs, but many verbs don’t fit into this category.
(9) a. John { dreamed / figured out / fretted / panicked / realized / thought /
understood / etc. } about Mary. Mental state
4 I recorded the first 1000 results for a search for N-about sequences, sorted by frequency; note that
Davies 2008- results are unstemmed, and so with stemming for plurals, this would amount to nearly
every hit providing a new result. Future work would involve analyzing these results quantitatively.
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b. John { asked / babbled / bitched / chimed in / contacted me / hinted /
gossiped / joked / lied / published / responded / talked / etc.} about Mary.
Communication
c. John { hesitated / read / researched / smiled / etc. } about Mary. Other
To assess the range of verbs, I performed a similar search in Davies 2008- for
V-about sequences. The first 1000 results (again unstemmed) led to 170 unique
verbs after removing duplicates and false positives that take just an about-PP, as
well as 228 additional verbs that take about-PPs only in combination with another
clause or argument. For reasons of space I will largely ignore this latter class here,
though they are obviously important to understand in the long run.5 To assess
the status of verbs that do take just about-PPs in the larger context of attitude
predicates, I aggregated this sample with several other attitude verb classifications
in the literature, most notably Hacquard & Wellwood 2012. The resulting database
has 654 frames representing 554 unique verbs. I then annotated these with whether
they are compatible with about-PPs, including annotations for uncertainty. (Future
work involves multiple annotators, and crowd-sourcing of these judgments.) Of this
sample, 213 take just about-PPs; excluding cases where the judgment is unclear, this
is 35% of the sample. In this sample, this is comparable to the distribution of verbs
that take to-infinitivals (30%), for-to infinitivals (39%), and gerundives (40%).
From this comparison I conclude that about is very productive, and therefore
that a compositional account is desirable. While this method is too coarse for more
quantitative analysis, future work will allow for metrics such as inter-annotator
reliability. The productivity argument rules out a purely formal account of about.
2.3 Internal arguments to about
Existing strategies have tended to focus on just one use of about: either about+DP or
about+interrogative. However, about is consistent in allowing both types of internal
5 The major factor seems to be whether the verb is obligatorily transitive, setting aside the about-PP.
(Thanks to Paul Portner, p.c., for this suggestion.) This suggests both that about-PPs are pure
modifiers of attitude verbs, and that selectional differences between pairs like think and believe that
seem major at first glance, may be somewhat superficial. Example (iii) illustrates a case of believe
taking both an about PP and its normal clausal argument.
(i) Alfonso thought about Joanna.
(ii) * Alfonso believed about Joanna.
(iii) Alfonso believed about Joanna that she was clever.
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arguments. Across the contexts illustrated above, about can take as its internal
argument a DP, or an interrogative CP.6
(10) a. John heard a tale about Rapunzel. Referential
b. John read a book about { cats / linguistics / French }.
Bare plural / subject matter
c. John read a story about every doctor at the practice. Quantified
d. Alfonso asked about { the price of milk / the capital of Italy }.
Individual concept-denoting
(11) a. Alfonso asked about {whether Joanna was going / why Joanna was going /
who else was going}.
b. The email is about {whether Joanna was going / why Joanna was going /
who else was going}.
c. I was surprised by the phone call about {whether Joanna was going / why
Joanna was going / who else was going}.
This data suggests a systematic relationship between about+DP and about+interrogative
in meaning. Moreover, it bears on both the formal strategy and the de re strategy.
For the formal strategy, it raises the question of why the case-marking of DPs and
interrogatives should be connected. This question in fact appears independently of
about, and I will not attempt to provide an answer to it: in my sample, the distribution
of DP-licensing and interrogative-licensing are in general highly correlated. To the
de re strategy, it raises the question of what it means to be a de re ascription about a
question; Moulton 2009 does not discuss interrogative data.
While DPs that appear as the argument to about often intuitively seem question-
like, it is worth distinguishing them from ‘concealed questions’ (Baker 1968;
Grimshaw 1979; Heim 1979 etc.). Concealed question DPs are ones like the price of
milk that can appear as direct arguments to some question-embedding predicates.
While these DPs can appear as arguments to about, we also find referential argu-
ments such as proper names that cannot be concealed questions in the usual sense
(see Romero 2005: §2.4.3 among others).
2.4 Over-productivity
To really assess the reduction strategy, we must examine the range of verbs that
take about. Recall that the reduction strategy is to reduce the denotation of an
about-PP to one of the better understood argument types, in the case of Boër 1978, a
proposition-denoting argument. A basic prediction of this variety of account is that
6 Gerunds can also appear in this position, but I will not deal with them here.
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Count finite
Group (+marginal) Examples reports? int.s? DPs?
1: 71 (+2) ask, find out, tell, know ! ! !
2: 20 (+4) inquire, notify X, wonder ! ! x
2b: 4 (+2) curse, moan, preach ! x !
3: 62 (+6) argue, joke, persuade, think ! x x
4: 31 (+3) lie, talk, meet x x x
Table 1 Selectional behavior of About-taking verbs
the distribution of about-PPs will track the distribution of the ‘more basic’ argument
type; for Boër 1978 this should be that-clause arguments, but one could go the
other way. What I show in this section is that the distribution of about cross-cuts all
relevant selectional restrictions, and is therefore independent of such restrictions.
Using the sample of 170 verbs discussed above that take about, I analyzed the
distribution of about-PP licensing in comparison with declarative, interrogative, and
DP arguments. The results are shown in Table 1 (see the appendix for longer verb
lists). If a verb licenses any kind of clausal complement at all, I have given it a check
in the ‘reports?’ column. If it licenses interrogative clauses, I have given it a check
in the ‘int.s?’ column, and similarly for DPs. The counts are given in the second
column, with parenthetical indication of cases that marginally take about.
While more empirical work must be done before drawing strong conclusions
from this data, several important patterns emerge. First, and this is what I will focus
on in the present paper, the distribution of about clearly cross-cuts the distribution
of both interrogatives and DPs as basic arguments. There are many verbs that take
about but not interrogative clauses, and many verbs that take about but not DPs.
Second, there is a non-trivial group of verbs (group 4) that otherwise would not be
classified as attitude predicates, as they don’t take other sorts of clausal complements,
but nonetheless take about-PPs. These verbs, it should be highlighted, do not take
that-clauses. Third, there are non-trivial asymmetries between interrogatives and
DPs (e.g. group 2b is marginal at best). I will not deal with these asymmetries here
beyond noting them, and in fact in the larger sample of verbs a similar relationship is
present (in both cases highly significant on a Chi-Square). This pattern is a blow for
the reduction strategy: one cannot easily reduce about-PPs to either question-like or
proposition-like meanings.
Approached from another direction we get the same result: in pairs like (12) the
about-PP seems to contribute something different: in (12a) it intuitively contributes
a question-like meaning, and in (12b) a proposition-like meaning. It is the verb itself
that determines this.
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(12) a. Alfonso asked about why Joanna quit.
b. Alfonso told me about why Joanna quit.
Rather than reducing an about-PP denotation to a particular, more ‘basic’ kind of
attitude ascription, data like this suggests that the account must generalize to handle
a wide variety of predicates and attitudes.
I now return briefly to Moulton’s (2009) proposal that about-PPs provide a res
for an attitude report. Moulton’s main argument for this view is that about can
co-occur with that-clauses.
(13) John’s belief about that idea is that it is wrong.
(14) John believed about that idea that it is wrong.
This is an important data point, and it is one that any account should handle, but
I suggest it is orthogonal to the possibility of a res argument: it simply suggests that
one or both of these are modifiers. Beyond this, the de re proposal leaves several
important questions open. Most importantly, (i) if about-PPs do not determine the
content of an attitude, it is nonetheless necessary to understand how a hearer recovers
content given just an about-PP, something that they manifestly do. Several further
issues remain: (ii) what explains the predicative use? (Higgins 1973; Kratzer 2006),
and finally, (iii) what does it mean for the full range of content-bearing entities, e.g.
a book or a poem to have a res? The idea behind Moulton’s account is not obviously
wrong, but any implementation must answer these questions.
2.5 Summary
The existing strategies for understanding about either fail entirely, or leave important
questions unanswered. The formal strategy is eliminated on grounds of productivity,
with predication as its worst case. The de re strategy, while not necessarily wrong,
leaves too many questions unanswered, and also founders on predicative uses. The
reduction strategy, which a priori might seem like the most plausible, fails on the
sheer breadth of predicates that about-PPs can combine with: no single argument
type is general enough to lead to a good reduction account.
In the next section I turn to a strategy that is successful: what might be termed
the generalization strategy. That is, I argue that the right account of about has two
components: a very general notion of the content of an attitude, and a decoupling of
selectional restrictions per se from the ways in which an ‘argument’ to an attitude
predicate interacts with the content of that attitude.
3 Analysis: a general notion of content
There are, at this point, three key desiderata for an analysis of about:
343
Rawlins
(15) Desiderata for an analysis of about
a. It is highly productive, both within particular categories, and across cate-
gories.
b. It is consistent in its internal argument types.
c. It cross-cuts other potentially relevant selectional restrictions for the predi-
cates it combines with.
My proposal for resolving this situation has three parts. First, about-PPs denote
properties of content-bearing, potentially abstract, entities, and tell us something
about that content; I develop this idea in §3.1. Second (§3.2) we need a sufficiently
general notion of content so as to cover the full range of verbs illustrated in Table
1. Finally, about-PPs don’t directly determine content, but identify something
that it is ‘related to,’ and I provide an implementation in §3.3. I then turn to DP
arguments, arguing that they are derived via a coercion operation in §3.4. The
analysis culminates with four case studies of important verbs that take about-PPs in
§3.5.
3.1 Cross-categoriality: the dual life of entities and content
We have seen that about-PPs combine with a large and diverse range of both nominal
and verbal predicates, and can serve as predicates themselves. My proposal is
that this is best accounted for by adopting two ideas from recent work on attitude
ascriptions (Kratzer 1998, 2006; Moulton 2009; Anand & Hacquard 2009, 2013;
Hacquard 2010; see also Moltmann 1989, 2003, 2013). The first is that attitude
verbs are neo-Davidsonian predicates. The second is that they are predicates of
eventualities that have what has been termed content (Hacquard 2006, 2010). As
Hacquard 2010 puts it, “if John believes it rained, the object of his belief is the
proposition that it rained, while the content [of the belief eventuality] is the set of
all propositions that John believes; the intersection of these is the set of worlds
compatible with what he believes, his doxastic alternatives.” Following Hacquard,
I will assume a function CON that maps eventualities into their content, though
the details will differ. (Moreover, it is far from clear that the content of a belief
state consists of all one’s beliefs; this certainly isn’t true for a thinking event.) This
function is defined only if its argument ‘has content.’ Hacquard and others who use
this notion assume that content is propositional; below I will suggest that this must
be elaborated. On Kratzer’s view, the role of a complementizer such as that is to
connect up its internal argument, a proposition, with the content of an eventuality. (I
spell out the details for the verbal case in §3.5.)
Following Moltmann 2003 and Moulton 2009, this idea can be straightforwardly
extended to content nouns. A noun like belief is a property of (potentially abstract)
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entities that have content. I will be agnostic as to whether it is directly a property of
eventualities in this case, or a property of some nominalized form of eventualities.
Finally, an about-PP is also a property of things that have content, and I suggest
that it imposes no restrictions on its external argument beyond this. This in one blow
accounts for its wide, cross-categorial distribution, as well as the predicative uses.
(16) Content nouns and About, preliminary sketch:
a. JbookK= λxe . x is a book ∧ x has content
b. JaboutK= λc? .λxe . x is a book ∧CON(x) is related to c
defined only if x ∈ Dom(CON)
There are two main gaps in this denotation. The first is what c is and what is returned
by the content function, and the second is what it means to be related to; I turn to
these in the next two sections.
Before proceeding, I discuss two important predictions. First, we would expect
on this account that the distribution of about with verbal predicates is independent of
the distribution of clausal arguments, and this is in fact the over-productivity puzzle
in a nutshell. A more specific prediction is that we would expect verbs that do not
otherwise take clausal arguments (for lexical reasons) to license about-PPs. This
prediction is borne out in the group 4 about-taking verbs identified in §2.4, verbs
like lie and talk. Intuitively, these verbs do describe events that have some content,
in this case, garden-variety speech events, but one cannot lie that or talk that. (It is
somewhat unclear why not, but I will assume that this is a lexico-syntactic fact and
not a necessary truth.)
A second and parallel prediction is that the variety of content nouns that take
about should not be bound by which ones take clausal arguments – which turn out to
be less than half the sample. The literature on content nouns has focused on rather
abstract ones like fact, claim, rumor, and thing, but the distribution of about shows
that this class is much wider than that, dominated by media-artifact nouns such as
book, movie, communication nouns, and a wide variety of manner-ish mental state
predicates such as anxiety. By understanding these nouns (or at least, the relevant
NPs) as denoting properties of things that have a dual life as entities(/eventualities)
and ‘content,’ we gain an understanding of the distribution of about-PPs as well as
what content is.
3.2 Rich content
If an about-PP is a property of a content-bearing individual, what does it say about
the content of that individual?7 To get there, we first must establish what content is
7 This amounts to the question I raised for Moulton’s (2009) proposal: what can one infer about content
from just a res argument?
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in the first place. The final proposal makes use of tools from Lewis 1988a,b, and in
particular, the notion of orthogonality.
Previous work on content in attitude ascriptions has generally assumed proposi-
tional content. The wide variety of predicates that about can combine with makes it
challenging to maintain this assumption. Here it is useful to focus on communication
events. In both the nominal and verbal domain, predicates that take ask can describe
events whose content is purely question-like (ask, question) and those whose content
is purely assertion-like (tell, claim).
(17) Alfonso { asked / told me } about Joanna.
(18) The { question / claim } is about Joanna.
Thus, a notion of content minimally rich enough to handle questions is neces-
sary.8 To represent content, I will adopt Lewis’s notion of subject matters. In (19) I
provide a definition, modified from Lewis to handle partiality (discussed below).
(19) Let a subject matter a be an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric,
transitive) in some subset ofW.
Formally, a subject matter resembles question-meanings on a partition semantics
for questions (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984).9 On this kind of account, an inter-
rogative clause denotes a (curried) equivalence relation on worlds; an equivalence
relation determines a set of alternatives that correspond to completely connected
blocks of worlds, and these alternatives (intuitively) correspond to complete answers
to the question. For example, whether it is raining would denote a function like
λw1 . λw2 . raining(w1) = raining(w2). Worlds are in a block if they resolve the
‘raining’ predicate in the same way, and so this relation determines two alternatives:
one consisting of worlds where it is raining, and one consisting of worlds where it
isn’t.
Lewis’s subject matters were relations in all of W, but here I have allowed
for subsets. This is to allow for what Groenendijk & Roelofsen (2009); Ciardelli
et al. (2010) term ‘hybrids.’ A hybrid is an alternative structure that both provides
informational and issue-like content. Following their terminology, I will refer to
subject matters that are partial as informative, and subject matters that have more
than one alternative as inquisitive. (See Hulstijn 1997; Groenendijk 1999; Isaacs &
Rawlins 2008 for earlier instances of these notions.) Much of the generality of this
notion of content follows from partiality. Figure 1 illustrates these notions visually.
In (20) I have provided the formalization (see Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009).
8 A similar point could be made about commands, with nouns like order, but I will not pursue this here.
9 This proposal could be completely translated into a Hamblin semantics for questions (Hamblin 1973;
Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002 inter alia; see Rawlins 2013 for a treatment of orthogonality in a Hamblin
semantics.) Here I stick to a partition semantics in order to be closer to Lewis’s definitions.
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(i) A purely informa-
tive subject matter
W ⊃ Dom(I1),
Alts(I1) = {Dom(I1)}
I1
W
(ii) A purely inquisi-
tive subject matter
W = Dom(I1), |Alts(I1)| > 1
W, I1
(iii) A hybrid
subject matter
W ⊃ Dom(I1),
|Alts(I1)| > 1
I1
W
Figure 1 Informative, inquisitive, and hybrid subject matters
(20) a. Dom(a) = {w | 〈w,w〉 ∈ a}
b. Inquisitivity: InqD(a) = 1 iff ∃w1,w2 ∈ Dom(a)∩D : 〈w1,w2〉 6∈ a
c. Informativity: Inf D(a) = 1 iff ∃w ∈ D : w 6∈ Dom(a)
d. a is purely inquisitive: InqD(a)∧¬Inf D(a).
a is purely informative: Inf D(a)∧¬InqD(a)
a is hybrid otherwise.
These tools are sufficient to begin to understand a broad range of content nouns;
several starting points are shown below. A question characterizes speech acts whose
content is purely inquisitive, and a claim those which are purely informative. (One
might want to place further restrictions on any of these.) A lie is also purely
informative, but needn’t be a potential speech act, and has to have false informative
content. A book also has content, but the noun mainly places restrictions on the
physical form of the book – allowing for rich, complicated hybrid content.10
(21) JquestionKc= λxe . x is a speech act ∧ InqW(CON(x))∧¬InfW(CON(x))
(22) JclaimKc= λxe . x is a speech act ∧¬InqW(CON(x))∧ InfW(CON(x))
(23) JlieKw,c= λxe .¬InqW(CON(x))∧ InfW(CON(x))∧w 6∈ Dom(CON(x))
(24) JbookKc= λxe . x is a book ∧ x has content
10 One prediction is that we might expect coercion to lead to content where there otherwise might not
have been. A case where this prediction is borne out is certain interesting time interval nouns like
week, month, afternoon. These don’t generally entail the existence of content. However, they do take
about-phrases, which force a reading where the interval contains some communicative content:
(iv) We had an afternoon about the project recently.
This coercion is unsurprising on the present account, and amounts to presupposition accommodation
of the presupposition introduced by about.
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I2
(i) Two subject matters that
are completely orthogonal
I1
I2
I1
(ii) Two subject matters
that are not orthogonal
Figure 2 Orthogonality illustrated
I suggest that the combination of a question-like alternative structure with the
notion of a hybrid provides a rich and general enough notion of content to cover
the full range of uses of about under discussion in this paper. I now turn to what to
actually do with this notion of content.
3.3 Orthogonality and rich content
In this section I develop a notion of what it might mean to be related to in terms of
Lewis’s (1988a,b) notion of orthogonality. I will propose that one subject matter
is ‘about’ another just in case the two matters are not orthogonal. For Lewis, two
subject matters are orthogonal if, roughly, the equivalence classes they determine
(i.e., the alternatives) completely cross-cut each other. The intuition is illustrated
in Figure 2. In (i), every cell in I1, an equivalence class of worlds in the subject
matter/equivalence relation, overlaps with every cell in I2. Determining one of the
issues either partially or completely would have no impact on the determination of
the other. In contrast, in (ii) one of the cells in I2 does not overlap any cell in I2, and
so the two are not orthogonal.
At a technical level something more must be said; as introduced above, Lewis
dealt only with total relations inW, but I allow partial relations. (The above picture
can be made sensible on Lewis’s original formulation by assuming that the inverse
space for each subject matter constitutes an alternative as well.) What I will do
here is provide an operation for converting a partial matter into a total one, and use
Lewis’s original formula. TheW-closure of a subject matter a is a with any extra
worlds added into one further alternative. Effectively, it takes the negation of the
informative content of a and builds the union of that with a. For a purely inquisitive
matter, it will have no impact. For a purely informative matter, it will build what
is intuitively the ‘polar question’ version of that subject matter. The most general
hybrid case is illustrated in Figure 3. The resulting definition of orthogonality is
given in (26).
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I1
W
⇒ W-closure(I1)
Figure 3 W-closure: converting partial subject matters to total subject matters
(25) W-closure(a) = a∪{〈w1,w2〉 ∈W×W |w1 6∈ Dom(a)∧w2 6∈ Dom(a)}
(26) Orthogonality
a1 and a2 are orthogonal iff ∀w,v ∈W : ∃u ∈W : 〈u,w〉 ∈W-closure(a1)∧
〈u,v〉 ∈W-closure(a2)
Put intuitively, a question q1 is about a question q2 if at least some resolutions
of q1 move us towards resolving q2. A proposition is about a question if its truth
or falsity moves us towards answering that question. In fact, this notion closely
resembles and generalizes the definition of ‘relevance’ introduced into the question
literature by Roberts 1996 (see especially Beaver, Roberts, Simons & Tonhauser
2011: def. 13).11
Building on this, in (27) I give a revised entry for about. For convenience, I
have curried the c argument. This entry takes an argument c that is type-wise a
(Groenendijk & Stokhof-style) question denotation, an x that must have content, and
returns true just in case that content is non-orthogonal to the subject matter provided
by c.
(27) JaboutK= λc〈s〈st〉〉 .λxe .CON(x) is not orthogonal to {〈w1,w2〉|c(w1)(w2)}
defined only if x ∈ Dom(CON)
To illustrate this, consider the example in (28). The book denotes an entity with
(rich, potentially hybrid) content. About how Rasputin died as a predicate conveys
that that content is not orthogonal to the resolution of the question of how he died,
which provides a set of alternatives each determining completely a manner of death.
(28) The book was about how Rasputin died.
I return to the interaction with attitude verbs in §3.5; at this point I have presented
a complete account of the interaction of interrogative about-PPs and content nouns.
Both are properties of content-bearing individuals. As a predicate, an about-PP takes
that individual as an argument, and in post-nominal position, the about PP would act
as an intersective modifier (i.e., combine via a rule like Predicate Modification).
11 Some important sanity checks: a proposition (purely informative subject matter) is not orthogonal to
itself, its negation, or anything it entails. Because this notion is symmetric, it is also not orthogonal to
anything that entails it. Two strictly consistent propositions are, in contrast, necessarily orthogonal.
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3.4 DP arguments via coercion
In §2.3, I showed that about systematically takes both interrogative and DP argu-
ments no matter its external distribution, suggesting that the two argument types
should be treated uniformly at some level. Just about any DP appears in this position,
and when in this position can be coerced into a question-like meaning. This stands
in contrast to so-called ‘concealed question’ DPs, which are much more restricted
(e.g. disallow referring expressions). This coercion is highly context-sensitive. For
example, if Joanna was supposed to be at a restaurant but wasn’t there yet, (29)
could mean that Alfonso wondered if she was coming, or if she was just late. In a
different context, it might involve wondering whether she was happy, or how she
was going to get to the party if her car was in the shop, or any number of other
things. Similarly, the example in (30) involves knowing something intuitively more
propositional, but the exact content could vary: Alfonso could know that Joanna
wasn’t going to dinner, or that she was so unhappy she had moved away, or that she
was getting a ride with Henry, or any number of other things. Clearly, the coercion
process must allow quite a bit of room for context sensitivity.
(29) Alfonso wondered about Joanna.
(30) Alfonso knew about Joanna.
Accordingly, I will give an extremely flexible coercion operation. The proposal
is that the DP is coerced into a 2-alternative subject matter constructed from some
salient property of the referent.
(31) Jabout αDPK= λxe .∃P ∈ D〈e〈st〉〉 .P is salient ∧JaboutK(λw1 .λw2 .P(JαDPK)(w1) = P(JαDPK)(w2))(x)
It is important to note that without the salience criterion this would be too weak:
unrestricted existential quantification over properties in this kind of operation can
easily lead to triviality (Thomason forthcoming).12,13
12 There are several potential alternatives that I will leave for future research. One idea, building on
Moulton’s (2009) de re proposal, would be to try to construct a subject matter around the set of
situations whose minimal elements contain the referent. This is suggested by borderline cases that do
not so intuitively involve ‘propositional’ subject matters:
(v) Alfonso cares about Joanna.
(vi) Alfonso dreamed about Joanna.
In (ii), for example, it may be that Joanna simply needed to be present in Alfonso’s dream. While
this kind of meaning can be represented propositionally, it is unclear whether it should be. See also
Yablo forthcoming for an extended discussion of ‘aboutness’ from a philosophical perspective.
13 There are a number of further issues raised by DP arguments that I will not fully resolve here. While
non-concealed-questions have been my focus, concealed question DPs (e.g. the price of milk) can
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3.5 Four verbal case studies
When about-PPs combine with attitude predicates, the proposal is that it has the
same entry, and that x is a content-bearing eventuality. This directly follows Kratzer’s
(2006) proposal for that-PPs. I will follow Kratzer also in assuming that composition
occurs via Chung & Ladusaw’s (2004) Restrict operation: it modifies but does not
saturate the outermost argument of a function. A formulation of this operation is
given in (32). An extension of Kratzer-style regular complementizers is given in
(33) and (34), assuming that v is the type of an eventuality, and that α,β are types.
(32) Where β = 〈β1〈...〈βnt〉〉〉 s.t. n≥ 0: Restrict(A〈αβ 〉,B〈αt〉) =
λx ∈ Dα .λy1 ∈ Dβ1...λyn ∈ Dβn .A(x)(y1)...(yn)∧B(x)
(33) JthatK= λ p〈st〉 .λev .CON(e) = {〈w1,w2〉 | p(w1) = p(w2) = 1}
(34) JCQK= λ p〈s〈st〉〉 .λev .CON(e) = {〈w1,w2〉 | p(w1) = p(w2)}
A that-clause equates a propositional argument packaged as a purely informative
subject matter with a content. An interrogative clause simply equates its question-
denotation (which will be inquisitive) to the content of e. Believing that p involves
having a belief whose content is the purely informative matter of p.
As a starting point for about, let us consider the verb ask. This verb describes
speech events whose content is purely inquisitive. (There might be further restric-
tions, such as requiring them to be cross-speaker.)
(35) JaskK= λev .λws . e is a speech event in w∧ Inq(CON(e))∧¬Inf (CON(e))
An about-PP, when it combines with ask via Restrict, will simply conjoin its about-
ness condition to the internal formula in (35). For example, if someone asks about
Joanna, they are the agent of a speech event whose content is purely inquisitive, and
whose content is not orthogonal to some subject matter constructed from a salient
property of Joanna. The resulting formula is shown in (36).
appear as the argument to about, and more may need to be said about this case. A second, related
issue, concerns scope. (Thanks to a SALT reviewer for raising this point.) DP arguments can be
interpreted de dicto, and the coercion above does not obviously lead one to expect this.
(vii) Alfonso read a story about a unicorn. (6 a unicorn exists.)
More generally, quantified DPs can appear in this position. What I suggest is that the analysis
presented here can be integrated with ‘off-the-shelf’ solutions to these problems: the scope of a
quantified DP in about PPs in DPs amounts to the problem of inverse linking (May & Bale 2007), and
the concealed-question problem may amount to how to deal with individual concepts in this position
(Heim 1979; Romero 2005; Frana 2010).
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(36) Jask about JoannaK= Restrict(JaskK ,Jabout JoannaK) =
λes .λws . e is a speech event in w∧ Inq(CON(e))∧¬Inf (CON(e))∧
∃P〈e〈st〉〉 .P is salient ∧
CON(e) is not orthogonal to {〈w1,w2〉P(J.)(w1) = P(J.)(w2))}
It is important to consider a case that is less question-oriented, and a factive
verb is an ideal test case. Here I consider know. There is obviously far more to
say about this verb than I will do here, and the goal is simply to ensure that the
account makes the correct predictions for know about. The entry in (38), setting
aside many issues, covers the about case (as well as that-clauses and interrogative
clauses). Basically, the holder of the knowledge state believes an alternative in the
content of the state if that alternative is true at the evaluation world. Moreover, it is
presupposed that their doxastic alternatives fully contain the subject matter. When
content is purely informative, the presupposition leads to factivity, and in the case
of inquisitive content, it forces there to be some true alternative. When this verb is
handed an about-PP, the holder must believe the true resolution of the subject matter.
(The function Alts here converts from a partition semantics into a Hamblin-style set
of alternative propositions, for convenience.)
(37) Alts(a) = {p〈st〉 | ∃u ∈ Dom(a) : ∀v ∈ Dom(a) : 〈u,v〉 ∈ a↔ p(v) = 1}
(38) JknowK=
λ sv .λws . state(s)∧∀p ∈ Alts(CON(s)) : (p⊇ Doxw(Holder(s)))↔ p(w)
defined for w,s only if Dom(CON(s))⊇ Doxw(Holder(s))
To conclude, I give two more brief case studies, of the verbs think and talk. Think
is a prototypical group 3 verb (see §2.4), i.e., it does not take interrogative clauses,
but does take that-clauses and about. Similarly, talk is a prototypical group 4 verb,
and otherwise does not take embedded clauses.
The proposal for group 3 verbs is that some (though not all) of these verbs involve
meanings that interact non-trivially with inquisitive subject matters, and that this is
masked by selectional preferences; think is an example of this complicated situation.
The proposal for this verb in particular is that thinking involves contemplating
possibilities that are compatible with an agent’s doxastic alternatives. Thinking that
involves a purely informative subject matter, so the agent only considers one such
alternative. However, thinking about can involve contemplating multiple alternatives.
(39) JthinkK= λev .λws .Dom(CON(e))⊇ Doxw(Agent(e))∧
∀p〈st〉 ∈ Alts(CON(e)) : Agent(e) contemplates p
(40) Jthink about whether to go to the partyK=
λev .λws .Dom(CON(e))⊇ Doxw(Agent(e))
∧∀p〈st〉 ∈ Alts(CON(e)) : Agent(e) contemplates p
∧CON(e) = {〈w1,w2〉 |Agent(e) goes in w1 = Agent(e) goes in w2}
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This is illustrated in (40). Thinking about whether to go to the party involves an
event whose content consists of two possible alternatives: the agent goes in one,
doesn’t in the other. These truth-conditions are satisfied if they contemplate each of
these alternatives.
Finally, the account of group 4 verbs like talk is extremely straightforward. Such
verbs describe a speech event, and a speech event will have content, so it is entirely
unsurprising that about can combine with them. Some verbs like meet describe an
event that can have content, and about forces this.
(41) Jtalk about JoannaK=
λev .λws . talking(e)∧∃P ∈ D〈e〈st〉〉 .P is salient ∧
CON(e) is not orthogonal to {〈w1,w2〉 |P(J.)(w1) = P(J.)(w2)}
These case studies have illustrated the contribution of a general notion of content,
to flexibly disassociating complex content restrictions from argument selection.
4 Conclusions
I have argued, based on the productivity and ‘over-productivity’ of about-PPs, that
they are properties of potentially abstract entities or eventualities that have ‘content.’
They contribute some information about that content, namely that it is orthogonal
(in the sense of Lewis 1988a to a matter contributed by the content of the PP. A
book about Alfonso, therefore, is a book whose content, though being presumably
quite complex, is not orthogonal to the resolution of some property with respect to
Alfonso. The view of attitudes that this requires is distinctly non-classical. Following
most directly Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2009, attitude predicates are neo-Davidsonian
properties of eventualities that have content, and clausal complements as well as
about-PPs are also properties of such eventualities.
This work opens up a range of questions and future projects. First, I have
started to build a large, quantitatively analyzable sample of attitude predicates.
However, more work is required to firm up this data set, including the use of multiple
annotators. Despite its preliminary nature, however, this data set provided a wealth
of information on about. Second, I have left open many issues about about. Two
important questions are: (i) the behavior of modifiers of about-PPs (e.g. partly
about, all about), and (ii) the relationship between about-PPs and so-called res
arguments (Moulton 2009). I have argued that it is not sufficiently explanatory to
simply equate them, but this is hardly the end of the story. A final issue is the class
of verbs that don’t take about. The prediction is that if a verb does not characterize
content-denoting events, then about will not be licensed at all. This prediction seems
correct for purely ‘non-representational’ verbs such as want (Bolinger 1968; Anand
& Hacquard 2009, 2013), but I leave a full exploration to the future.
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Appendix: more examples of the verb types
All verbs take about-PPs. The criteria for taking a DP is conservative, including
anything (except cognate objects, which are too widely acceptable.) In particular,
the type 2B verbs except for ‘preach’ are all good only with concealed question DPs.
(42) Type 1 verbs (take interrogative and DP).
advertise, advise, agree, anticipate, ask, babble, blog, boast, chatter, check,
clarify, communicate, confess, crow, daydream, debate, decide, explain,
extrapolate, figure out, find out, forecast, foresee, forget, gossip, guess, hear,
howl, inform X, know, learn, mumble, murmur, mutter, overhear, point out,
probe, project, protest, read, realize, reason, recollect, regulate, remember,
remind, report, scream, scribble, share, shout, sign, signal, study, suspect,
tell X, tweet, understand, whisper, write, yell
(43) Type 2 verbs: take interrogative but not DP.
advise X, agree, boast, care, consult X, educate X, enlighten X, inform X,
inquire, notify X, question X, wonder, worry
(44) (Type 2b, converse case is marginal. Some possibilities: cry, gush, moan,
preach.)
(45) Type 3 verbs: take neither argument type. (Communication predominates.)
apologize, argue, bitch, brag, brood, carp, caution (X), chime in, comment,
complain, concur, conjecture, counsel X, fret, fume, gripe, grouse, grumble,
hint, insist, joke, kid (X), marvel, mislead, obsess, panic, persuade X,
petition, pray, pretend, quibble, quip, rant, rave, reassure X, reflect, remark,
reminisce, reply, respond, scoff, speculate, stew, swear, tease (X), think,
theorize
(46) Type 4 verbs: not otherwise used in (finite) indirect reports.
bicker, call (X), confuse X, contact X, differ X, discipline X, discourage
X, encourage X, fuss, impress X, laugh, lie, listen, press X, speak, talk,
deliberate, relax, meet, fight, hesitate, consult X, grill X
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